THERE IS No PLAIN MEANING: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF ERISA AND THE
"EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT" RULE
Kathryn E. Diazt
On June 12, 2000, a unanimous Supreme Court, in Pegram v.
Herdrich,' decided that a health maintenance organization ("HMO") that
provides monetary incentives to doctors who increase profits by limiting
patient care, does not violate the federal statute that governs employee
health benefits-the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA").2 This decision was rendered despite ERISA's requirement that
fiduciaries of benefit plans act exclusively in the interest of plan
beneficiaries.3
The Court outlined its argument in familiar terms, using more of an
economic efficiency or cost-benefit analysis than an enunciation of time
honored legal principles or a sober statutory interpretation. Its reasoning
was as follows:
L.HMOs are risk bearing organizations, and risk bearing
organizations need to control costs.'
2.One way to control costs is to provide incentives to physicians,
rewarding them for decreasing services and penalizing them for
excessive treatment.5
3."[I]n an HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in
providing less care, not more."6
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1. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
(2001).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2001).
4. 530 U.S. at 219.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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4."Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any
HMO scheme, and rationing necessarily raises some risks while
reducing others (ruptured appendixes are more likely;
unnecessary appendectomies are less so), any legal principle
purporting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would
embody,
in effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medical
7
risk."
5."The fiduciary is, of course, obliged to act exclusively in the
interest of the beneficiary, but this translates into no rule readily
applicable to HMO decisions or those of any other variety of
medical practice."8
6."[A]ny legal principle purporting to draw a line between good
and bad HMOs would embody in effect a judgment about
socially acceptable medical risk" that would turn on facts not
readily accessible to courts and on social judgments not wisel €
required of courts unless there cannot be resort to the legislature.
On Labor Day in 1974, less than a month after President Richard
Nixon resigned, President Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law.' Pegram
marks a little over a quarter of a century since the statute's enactment and
reflects a major policy pronouncement.
With a stock market boom then prevailing on Wall Street," babyboomers aging, 12 and the sunset of the Clinton administration, which was
known for its efforts to reform healthcare, 3 it is perhaps not surprising that
the Supreme Court should issue this decision. Pegram embraces the
ERISA statute as a marketplace phenomenon. Of course, failures of the
market economy, including externalities such as the plundering of pension
funds, led to Congress's passage of ERISA. But the rhetoric of the market
is invoked, whereby its risks and rewards will provide a necessary
corrective to the effects of judicial excess in the form of judgments about
"good" or "bad" HMO behavior.
7. Id. at 221.
8. Id. at 234.
9. Id. at221.

10. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 etseq.
11. See generally LAWRENCE

MISHEL ET AL., STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2000-2001
(2000) (explaining the stock market run-up of the 1990's effect on wealth). Still, less than
half of households hold stock in any form.
12. See generally The Federal Interagency Forum on Aging Related Statistics, Older
Americans
2000:
Key
Indicators
of
Well
Being,
available
at
http://www.agingstats.gov/chartbook2000 (explaining how baby-boomers, comprising those
born between 1946 and 1964, will begin to turn sixty-five in 2011, the size of the population
aged sixty-five or older is projected to double over the next thirty years).
13. Adam Clymer, Long Legislative Route for Clinton Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 1994, at A20.
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This article asks and seeks to answer how the current Supreme Court
unanimously issued such a carefree, arguably extralegal, decision in the
face of unambiguous statutory language imposing strict loyalty upon plan
fiduciaries. That employers are obligated to operate an employee benefit
plan for the exclusive benefit of employees is elusive in ERISA case law.
Additionally, acknowledgment of the employees themselves as agents in
the particular disputes is largely absent from the legal discourse. 5 ERISA
can be used to demonstrate how the meaning of laws are put forth and
strategically resisted.16 It can also be used to demonstrate how the law not
only reflects and accommodates the ideology of the private market and its
accompanying social practices, thus supporting social stability, but likewise
influences social and political life of which the debates over Social Security
and patients' rights are obvious examples. 7
This article addresses a cornerstone of traditional trust law, the
trustee's duty of undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries, which is enunciated
in ERISA's "exclusive benefit" rule. 8 The rule mandates that "a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties.., solely in the interest of the participants and

14. Commentators and legal scholars have been actively observing the philosophical
divisions on the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (2000) (citing
equal protection concerns and a lack of time to complete the presidential count as reasons to
declare Governor George W. Bush the winner of the 2000 presidential election); Sven Erik
Holmes, Symposium, 1999-2000 Supreme Court Review, 36 TULSA L.J. 1 (2000) (noting
that many of the Court's most high profile decisions reflect a 5-4 split). As to what is likely
to be the Court's most famous ruling, many suggested the decision was motivated by
political or personal interest as much as driven by ideology. Ronald Dworkin noted, "the
troubling question is being asked among scholars and commentators whether the Court's
decision would have been different if it was Bush, not Gore, who needed the recount to win
whether, that is, the decision reflected not ideological division, which is inevitable, but
professional self-interest." Ronald Dworkin, "A Badly Flawed Election," THE NEw YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, at 53 (Jan. 11, 2001). Citing two witnesses,
Newsweek magazine reported that at an election night party when returns were indicating a
possible Gore victory, Justice O'Connor exclaimed, "This is terrible." O'Connor's husband,
John O'Connor, explained that his wife was "upset because they planned to retire to
Arizona" and a Gore win meant "they'd have to wait another four years" because she did
not want a Democrat naming her successor. Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth
Behind the Pillars,NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000, at 46. Many have argued that the five
conservative justices, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas have "made this court the most activist Court in history." Dworkin,
supra. See also Robert G. Kaiser, Slim Majority Raises Fearof Court Partisanship,WASH.
POST, Dec. 10, 2000, at A-32; Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court,N.Y.
TwIES, Dec.12, 2000, atA33.
15. See generally ROGER COTrERRELL, LAw'S CoMMuNITY: LEGAL THEORY IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995).
16. Austin D. Sarat, Book Review, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129, 137 (2000).
17. See generally JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERESTS: BEYOND THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1996).

18. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2001).
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beneficiaries."' 9
When Congress enacted ERISA it purportedly made its intent clearthat, under the common law of trusts, traditional principles of fiduciary
obligations were to be applied to the administration of employee pension
and welfare benefit plans. The law of trusts developed as a device for the
wealthy to maintain ancestral land within the family, 20 but under ERISA,
trust principles provide a model for protecting benefits for working
people. 2 ' An ambiguity in the law of ERISA results, however, from a
blurring of traditional trust law fiduciary functions and settlor (benefit plan
sponsor) functions in two areas: (1) plan amendment and termination, and
(2) the denial of health benefits under employee welfare benefit plans that
utilize managed-care organizations for the delivery of healthcare services.
ERISA has never upheld the radical promises of labor democracy and
democratic capitalism of the 1934 Wagner Act. 22 Nor does it reflect
substantive promises of providing a means and place of employment free
from hazard and risk of death or serious physical harm, as did the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA").23

ERISA only

provides procedural rights and some measure of government access. Social
rights are not at stake and entitlements are not at issue. Therefore, I cannot
argue that there is a "fundamental mismatch between the goals of the act
and the approach taken.

24

This article instead explores how recent judicial decisions could have
been decided differently. It seeks to explain a doctrinal inconsistency in
the federal courts' interpretation of the duty of loyalty as applied to ERISA
trusts (or plans) over the past twenty-five years. This article is divided into
four major parts: two explanatory and two analytical.
Part I places ERISA in its social context and considers the events that
led to the Act's passage. Then it reviews the fundamentals of trust law, and

19. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
20. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 328-32, 350-52
(1990).
21. This irony, and problem, was suggested to me by a labor lawyer specializing in
ERISA. Interview with Lowell Peterson, Attorney (Dec. 7, 2000) (on file with the author).
Some argue that the "transferred usage of the trust" is problematic because "the statutory

design neglects to adjust for the differences between a trust deal that implements a
gratuitous transfer and a trust deal that is part of an exchange transaction." John H.
Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 663 n.200
(1995).
22. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (1935). On the
radical potential of the Wagner Act, see Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalizationof the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV.
265 (1978).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 600, et seq. (2001). See also CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK,
THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA (1986).
24. NOBLE, supra note 23, at 4.
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the common law background and legislative history of ERISA, as it applies
to both pensions and health benefits. I conclude Part I by explaining how
and why Congress decreed that ERISA should preempt state causes of
action. Although it probably was not the intent of Congress, some
decisions have interpreted the preemption doctrine in ways that often leave
employees worse off than they were before ERISA.2 Part II explains the
"exclusive benefit" rule and the fiduciary obligations owed employees and
beneficiaries under ERISA. The article then considers the tension between
fiduciary duties and the settlor function, and the social relations that inhere

in that tension.
I explore the legal decision-making process through the analyses of
leading pension cases in Part III, and health benefits cases in Part IV. In
both sections, I aim to reveal how ERISA jurisprudence both articulates
and creates class relationships. 26 In addition, these cases highlight an
interpretive struggle at play, a kind of jurisprudential competition to
determine the law of ERISA.27
This article is not meant to be a primer on ERISA, nor strictly a
doctrinal survey of this area of law. But it is necessary to focus on the
language of the Act's relevant provisions, which can be tedious, in order to
21
assess contested meanings of the statute.
One thing is certain about the Supreme Court's interpretations of the
statute: the "plain meaning" rule has not prevailed in connection with the
provisions of ERISA that require a fiduciary to "discharge his duties solely
in the interest of participants and beneficiaries." 29 If a cornerstone of

25. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's criticism that judicial review of benefits
denials under an arbitrary and capricious, rather than a de novo, standard, "afford[ed] less
protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was
enacted." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989).
26. That is, law-making as praxis. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Lawmaking as Praxis, 40
TELos 123 (1979).
27. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
JudicialField, 38 HASTINos L.J. 805 (Richard Terdiman trans.) (1987).
28. ERISA is "an enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved innumerable
disputes between powerful competing interests." Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,
262 (1993).
29. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). Even if one takes into account
that the text of the statute requires two things of the fiduciary, "to discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and.., for the
exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants ... and... defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the plan," the latter clause should not trump the former clause.
Id. (emphasis added). There is no ambiguity in the phrase "solely in the interest of
participants and beneficiaries." Ambiguity could be argued in connection with the phrase
"administering the plan." Does it mean administering in the sense of management of assets
and the more back-office operations of providing participants with information, processing
claims, mailing out benefits checks, and the like, or does it mean providing the benefits
themselves? Such an argument would be grasping at a thin reed, however, because the
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traditional trust law is the duty of loyalty, a basic tool of statutory
interpretation is to attribute to words in a statute their plain meaning. 30 A
useful scholarly intervention would be to apply hermeneutic and linguistic
theory to a statutory interpretation of ERISA. 3' Another article could
analyze Justice Scalia's schizophrenia with regard to ERISA, but perhaps
he is too easy a target.

His criticisms of the decline of formalism, as

reflecting anti-democratic values that privilege judicial preferences over
formal enactments, 32 seem like hollow posturing when one examines some
of the particular ERISA cases I review below.

The text of the statute is

sometimes regarded as an inconvenience. This was certainly true of the
Pegram decision. Like any other law, however, the plain language of the
ERISA statute is a result of the type of Congressional decision-making that

characterizes the regulatory and democratic process. But its democratically
adopted text is often a mere springboard for judicial lawmaking.3 3

Instead, my project is limited to a first step in developing a
constitutive theory of ERISA law. Through an examination of judicial
decision-making, I aim to show part of the social relations at play in
pension and health benefits law. This kind of analysis may, in turn, be
useful in developing an understanding of the role of the law in how issues
concerning pension and health benefits are conceptualized, framed, and
debated politically in the future.

benefits are to be provided in accordance with the plan documents, so that any reduction in
benefits to defray expenses of the plan sponsor would hardly be "reasonable expenses," but
improper to "defray." See ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) ("Every employee
benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.").
30. See, e.g., Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470,485-86 (1917) (citations omitted):
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the
law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed
it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. Where
the language is plain admits of no more than one meaning[,] the duty of
interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings
need no discussion. There is no ambiguity in the terms of this act.... Statutory
words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be used in their
ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.
31. See, e.g, Paul F. Campos, This is Not a Sentence, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 971 (1995);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Forward:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988); Philip P. Frickey, Faitlitd
Interpretation,73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the
RegulatoryState, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of
the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).

33. Id.

2001]

I.

No PLAIN MEANING

COVERAGE, POLICIES, AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE ERISA
STATUTE

A.

Background

As its name implies, the purpose of ERISA is to ensure that
employees' retirement monies are secure.34 Yet, despite its noble title,
ERISA is not to be mistaken for a mandatory social insurance program akin
to Social Security that guarantees a stream of retirement income for
workers. Instead, ERISA fits well within the voluntarist parameters of the
economic order and constitutional structure of the United States.
ERISA reflects social organization through voluntary private ordering.
It exemplifies ambivalence about the role of government in facilitating,
much less providing, social insurance. ERISA also reflects a conception of
law as a limiting device: legal rights protect us from the negative actions of
the state that restrain our freedoms or cause us harm, not to ensure that the
state will affirmatively protect us from the personal catastrophes that attend
ill health or aging.35
Unlike all of its industrial counterparts, the United States guarantees
neither medical services nor health insurance as a right of citizenship.
Similarly, unlike its Western European counterparts, the U.S. government
does not require that private firms provide pension or medical benefits to
their employees.36 Under the "contractual" model that governs U.S. labor
policy, employees, or, if they are unionized, their unions, are "free" to
bargain with employers for these types of compensation. Beyond that,
whatever is provided by Congress is a matter of "statutory grace," not
37
rights.

Since neither pension nor health benefit plans are required by U.S.
law, ERISA is concerned essentially with administrative protections and
procedures. It applies to all employee benefit plans maintained by any
private employer or union. It does not cover government and churchsponsored plans. 38 At its most basic, ERISA requires companies that
sponsor employee benefit plans to: (1) disclose to participants the details of
the plan; (2) report the plan to the federal government; and (3) honor
fiduciary obligations in dealing with plan assets and the administration of
34. ERISA was supplemented in 1977, when provisions governing claims under
employee health benefit plans were adopted. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2001).
35. See generally Wendy Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and
the Role of the State in the FramingEra, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267 (1992).
36. CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE As WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE

AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 7-8 (1997).
37. Parmet, supra note 35, at 274.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(l)-(2) (2001).

78

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4.1

benefits.39
Since providing a plan is a voluntary act in the first place, the decision
to adopt a plan is a management or settlor decision. No fiduciary duty is
implicated. Similarly, management may choose to end a plan at any time.
The only time fiduciary duties are required is during the term of the plan;
fiduciaries must honor the bible of the plan document, which ERISA
purportedly enshrines. A company sponsor often wears two hats: that of
the plan sponsor or settlor, who makes management decisions about what
level of benefits to provide (arguably, what stockholders will allow), and
that of a fiduciary in administering the plan, who should act with undivided
loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries. These dual roles inevitably
conflict.
This fiduciary/settlor dichotomy under ERISA is emblematic of
income entitlements in the U.S. welfare state. ERISA promotes the notion
of employee free choice, bargaining with equal power to management in a
voluntary contractual exchange for benefits. The paradox of ERISA is that
it promises unflinching loyalty to employees, while hiding a dagger that
can carve out the benefits at any time.
Private pension funds represent the largest pool of investment capital
in the United States (over five trillion dollars) and ERISA's function as
protective labor legislation "is tangled up with its function as a device to
regulate capital formation and financial intermediaries. ' 4° Through tax
breaks, ERISA provides an incentive to employers to provide benefits. But
to justify these tax breaks, ERISA imposes Internal Revenue Service and
Labor Department oversight of these plans to protect employees'
interests. 4 ERISA also provides tax incentives to employees to participate
in such plans, but it does not permit these benefits to be regarded as a
"right" in the sense of being deferred, but earned, wages. How wages are

39. ERISA is governed by regulatory schemes administered by three federal agencies:
the Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation. The Department of Labor enforces the provisions of Title I of the Act,
"Protection of Employee Benefit Rights," 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Title II of ERISA
amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § I et seq. Tax provisions
"qualifying" employee benefit plans and deferred compensation are codified in the Internal
Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 401 et seq. Title II contains the same requirements with regard
to participation, vesting, and funding that are found in Title I, but in the context of
provisions that must be satisfied to reap certain tax benefits. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401 et seq.
Title IV of ERISA covers plan termination insurance, whereby the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation carries out the enforcement scheme. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 4002 et
seq.
40. Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in
the FederalCommon Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153 at 162 (1995).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)-(2).
42. Some scholars contend that ERISA is primarily a tax vehicle. According to
correspondence of James Klein, President of the Association Benefits Council:
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conceived by ERISA and the relative power of labor and capital in this
regard are a concern for courts attempting to reconcile the Act's
sanctioning of the dual and often conflicting roles of corporate officers with
its stated policy objectives of protecting workers.
B.

FiduciaryDuties vs. "Settlor" Function Under TraditionalTrust Law

The inspiration for ERISA was traditional trust law, whereby a
"settlor" sets up a trust (res), or property, for a trustee fiduciary to
administer with undivided loyalty on behalf of a third party, the
beneficiary. Before 1974, employees were left to enforce their pension or
health benefit rights under general trust rules governed by applicable state
law. In an express trust, or one that is voluntary, 4' the owner of some
property, known as the "settlor," transfers it to some other person, known
as the "trustee," with the stipulation that the trustee not treat the money as
his own, but handle it in some way for the benefit of a third person, the
"beneficiary." ' 4 The essential features of a trust are: (1) a trustee; (2) a
duty; and (3) property. 45 Trusts come in many forms, but the root objective
is to vest property in a trustee who is under an obligation to handle it in
some particular way. It is presumed that this obligation is equitable and
that the trustee has no interest of his own in the property.4 6 The
overarching duty for the trustee is to exercise undivided loyalty in this
undertaking.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the duty of loyalty of a
trustee is described as follows:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.
(1) The trustee in dealing with the beneficiary on the
trustee's own account is under a duty to the beneficiary to
deal fairly with him and to communicate to him all material
facts in connection with the transaction which the trustee

For much of the 1980s and early 1990s, with large federal budget deficits, we
faced a situation where the tax policy tail wagged the retirement policy dog. So
much legislative activity was based on how to extract more revenue from the
pension system rather than what was sound retirement policy. As we entered an
era of budget surpluses, the focus on tax revenue needs subsided.
(October 19, 2000) (on file with author).
43. Compare express trusts to constructive trusts, which, under contract, statute, or
common law, are imposed between parties as a remedy for a breach of a duty or obligation
under a pre-existing arrangement.
44. SIMON GARDNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 2 (1990).
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 9.
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knows or should know.47
The comment to the Restatement notes that "[a] trustee is in a
fiduciary relation to the beneficiary and as to matters within the scope of
the relation he is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary
and not to enter into competition with him without his consent, unless
authorized to do so by the terms of the trust or by a proper court. ' ' 4 8
Thus, implicit in the trustee's duty of loyalty is the duty to administer
the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, and to exclude from
consideration one's own advantages and the welfare of third persons. 49 The
trustee "must refrain from placing himself in a position where his personal
interest or that of a third person does, or may, conflict with the interest of
the beneficiaries." 5
It is irrelevant whether a transaction was undertaken with the best of
intentions. All of the trustee's conduct that:
has any bearing on the affairs of the trust must be actuated by
consideration of the welfare of the beneficiaries and them alone.
He is in a position of such intimacy with those he is representing
and has such great control over their property that a higher
standard is established by the court of equity than would prevail
in the case of an ordinary business relation.'
The standard texts even attribute the high standard of care to the
vagaries of human nature and psychology. The loyalty rule is about
"keeping all trustees out of temptation" so that the administration of the
trust will proceed ethically and efficiently. 52
It is a well-known quality of human nature that it is extremely
difficult, or perhaps impossible, for an individual to act fairly in
the interests of others whom he represents and at the same time to
consider his own financial advantage. In most cases, consciously
or unconsciously, he will tend to make a choice which is
favorable to himself, regardless of its effect on those for whom
he is supposed to be acting. It is highly dangerous to fiduciary
administration
that the personal interests of the trustee come into
53
play.
Accordingly, as Benjamin Cardozo observed when he was the Chief
Justice of the New York Court of Appeals:

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 170 (1959) (emphasis added).

Id. at § 170 cmt. A.
See GEORGET. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 341 (1987).
Id.
Id. at §§ 341-42.
Id. at § 343.
Id. at § 342.
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Many forms of conduct permissible in the workaday world for
those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of honor the most sensitive, is the standard of behavior.5 4
Some see the trust concept as embedded in liberalism:
Liberalism takes it that everyone should be permitted the largest
possible degree of autonomy regarding their actions. So the
owner of some property is to be accorded the greatest possible
freedom as to how he deals with it .... The law provides the
in order to vindicate this liberty in
vehicle
55 of the express trust
him.
However, there is a contradiction between the greatest possible
freedom in how the settlor "deals" with the assets and the essential concept
of a trust.5 6 Although the settlor is "free" to establish the trust in the first
place, these assets must be set aside and used only for carefully defined
purposes-the traditional law of trusts frowns upon co-mingling."
While it draws on general principles of trust law, ERISA is more
stringent in two respects. First, the Act prohibits the insertion of any
exculpatory provisions in the creation of benefit plans. It states that, "[a]ny
provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a
fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation
or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.""5 The second
departure from trust law is that the statutory definition of a fiduciary
extends beyond the formal or named trustee.59 It includes "functional
fiduciaries," meaning anyone who exercises discretionary authority in the
administration of the plan or management of plan assets, including
investment advisors.60 This departure from traditional trust law was
effectuated to counterbalance ERISA's permissive side.
54. Meinhard v. Salman, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), quoted in BOGERT, supra note
49, at § 342 n.3.
55. GARDNER, supra note 44, at 14. Under trust law doctrine there are only four
reasons for curtailing this unfettered right: (1) paternalism (the settlor must be prevented
from acting against his own interests, as in someone who suffers a mental disability); (2)
communitarian (perhaps the most ideological, i.e., a trust on condition someone does not
marry would be disallowed as damaging the family and "humane influences like love"); (3)
utilitarian (the trust's effects should be beneficial, not deleterious, i.e., avoiding creditors;
and (4) rights-oriented (the trust would infringe other people's rights). Id. at 14-31.
56. Peterson, supra note 21.
57. Id.

58. ERISA § 410, 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994).
59. So that employees may know who is responsible for operating and administering
the plan, ERISA requires a "named fiduciary" to be provided in the plan document that
employees have access to. 29 U.S.C. § 1 102(a)(2) (1994), 29 C.F.R. § 2509 75-5 (1997).

60. ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(21) (2001).
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ERISA is permissive in that under § 408(c)(3), it permits a fiduciary to
be an officer, director, employee or agent of the plan's sponsor. 6' As noted,
traditional common-law trusts do not allow even the appearance of a
conflict of interest on the part of fiduciaries. Under ERISA, however,
fiduciaries do not breach their duty of loyalty when they hold a position in
conflict with the plan or trust. It is only "when they [make] investment
decisions out of personal motivations without making adequate provisions
that the trust's best interests are served" that fiduciaries breach any duty. 62
C.

Legislative History of ERISA

1.

Pension Plans

In 1875, the American Express Company established the first U.S.
pension plan, providing benefits for permanently disabled workers with
63
twenty years of continuous service. The Revenue Act of 1921 provided
the first tax incentives for private pension programs. 64 In 1925, there were
only about four hundred private pension plans in operation. Of these,
approximately one-third were sponsored by four of the country's largest
65
corporations. Most of the early plans, however, were bankrupted by the
66
Great Depression. The subsequent growth of pension plans in the U.S.
may be seen as rooted in a desire for financial security that "became part of
the national psychology after the onset of the Depression. 67 The
Depression erased the lifetime savings of millions "and undermined
American confidence in the historic tradition of self-reliance and in the
virtue of individual thrift as a way to provide for old age., 68 This

61. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1994).
62. Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078
(1989). This is regarded as a seminal case in ERISA jurisprudence. In Leigh, investments
made by the plan administrators who were also corporate officers resulted in large profits
for the plan. Nevertheless, plan administrators were found to have breached their duty of
loyalty to plan beneficiaries and participants because the profits were the result of investing
plan assets in a number of corporate takeover targets that were either sponsors of the plan or
related to those plan sponsors.
63. See generally Alicia Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions, in CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 71, 72 (Peter J. Wiedenbeck & Russell K. Osgood eds.,
1996).
64. Richard Hubbard, The Tax Treatment of Pensions, in PENSION FUNDING AND
TAXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW 43, 44 (Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones,
eds., 1994).
65. Unpublished asset data is on file with the Employee Benefit Research Institute. Id.
66. Munnell, supra note 63, at 72.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 73.

2001]

No PLAIN MEANING

devastation made way for public and private savings plans, the passage of
the Social Security Act of 1935, and fast growth in the number of private
pensions. Neither Social Security nor employee-sponsored pensions alone
provided adequate income, however, so each grew simultaneously.
The Revenue Act of 1938, which established the "nondiversion" rule
and made pension trusts irrevocable, addressed the concern that a company
could dissolve its pension plan immediately after it had made a sizable taxdeductible contribution. 9 Under the 1938 Act, a pension trust is taxexempt only if it is impossible, at any time prior to satisfaction of all
employee liabilities, for any part of the contributions or income to be used
for a purpose other than the exclusive benefit of employees or their
beneficiaries. °
By 1954, there were 25,000 pension plans with assets of $23.8
billion.7' This growth aroused concerns about the potential for fiduciary
abuse, encouraging Congress to pass the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act of 1958 ("WPPDA"), which established certain disclosure
requirements.72 Then, in the 1960s and early 1970s, evidence of misuse of
employee benefit plans and the failure of the WPPDA to protect the rights
of employees came to the attention of Congress. President Kennedy's
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds expressed concern over unduly
restrictive vesting, draconian forfeiture provisions, and the failure of73some
plans to accumulate sufficient funds to meet their benefit obligations.
The 1963 closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in South Bend,
Indiana was the watershed event that influenced Congress to pass ERISA,
even though it took eleven years. 74 When the Studebaker plant closed, the
company's pension plan covering 11,000 workers was terminated. The
plan was so underfunded that 4,000 workers between the ages of forty and
fifty-nine, with at least ten years of service, and whose pensions had vested,
received only fifteen cents on the dollar of their accrued benefits. 75 They
were the lucky ones; those whose pensions had not vested got nothing.
The legislative history of ERISA reflects none of the explosive interor intra-class conflict that arose over other workplace-related legislation
69. Hubbard, supra note 64.
70. Id. at 43-44.
71. Id. at44.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 301 (repealed 1974).
73. See Hubbard, supra note 64, at 44 (citing the President's Committee on Corporate
Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, Public Policy and
Private Pension Programs: A Report to the President on Private Employee Retirement
Plans(U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965)).
74. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUcE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 62, 77 (2d ed. 1995); Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Danger of Ignoring Plain
Meaning: IndividualRelieffor Breach of FiduciaryDuty Under ERISA, 41 WAYNE L. REv.
1233 (1955); Fisk, supra note 40, at 161.
75. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 74, at 62.
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(e.g. the National Labor Relations Act or workers' compensation). 76
ERISA was not movement-generated; it was neither hailed as progressive
nor decried as socialistic (as health care reform would be twenty years
later). It was, however, constituent-driven and had moderate Republican
Jacob Javits as one of its sponsors.77 Congress was well aware of prior
abuses such as the pillaging of plan assets and tragedies such as the
Studebaker plan, and blamed plan fiduciaries for underfunding, selfdealing, misappropriating plan funds, and imprudent investing. 78 The year
before ERISA was enacted, Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell argued that
"[m]ost people plan on [their] pension for retirement security and never
know that pensions are no more certain than horseraces. 79
Congress, therefore, pursued three primary objectives: (1) securing
benefit promises to make sure plans were funded; (2) creating the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. ("PBGC") 8°---the only social insurance aspect of
the Act--which provides minimum levels of insurance guaranteeing
payments for vested participants; and (3) increasing benefit entitlement
through greater participation and faster vesting.8' Some contend that all of
these goals have been achieved.82
The official Congressional findings and declaration of the policy of

76. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916 (1963); KAREN ORRIN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE
LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1991); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE

CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918 (1968); Klare, supra note 26.
77. 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974). Senator Jacob Javits and Senator Harrison A.

Williams were the two principal Senate sponsors. See also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985).
78. See CONG. REC., supra note 77; LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 75, at 62.
79. RALPH NADER & KATE BLACKWELL, You AND YOUR PENSION 2 (1973).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (1994).
81. See Dallas L. Salisbury, Policy Implications of Changes in Employer Pension
Protection, in PENSIONS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 33-58 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Dallas
L. Salisbury, eds., 1993).
82. A fourth goal was to expand defined benefit plans, but the result has been just the
opposite. The relative number of defined benefit plans is shrinking, while defined
contribution plans such as 401(k)'s-referring to the Internal Revenue Code provision that
renders these plans "qualified," for specific tax treatment, I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994)-are
increasingly prevalent.

Defined benefit plans typically pay monthly benefits at retirement with amounts based
on the worker's length of service and earnings. The benefits are usually financed with
employer contributions based on actuarial estimates of the cost of future benefits. Defined
contribution plans, on the other hand, provide for a fixed rate of contributions that are
allocated to individual accounts for each worker.
The benefits are based on the
contributions (in almost half of these plans, participants contribute wages to the account)

plus any gains, losses, and income expenses. In a defined contribution plan, the worker
receives a lump-sum payout at retirement, or when he leaves the plan. See generally
Hubbard, supra note 64, at 45-47; Thomas H. Paine, THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF
PENSIONS: WHERE EMPLOYERS ARE HEADED; Salisbury, supra note 81, at 33-58.
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ERISA are that:
the continued well-being and security of millions of employees
and their dependents are directly affected by [pension and
benefit] plans; that they are affected with a national public
interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the
stability of employment and the successful development of
industrial relations...;
that owing to the lack of employee information and adequate
safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for
the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that
disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to
the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans;
that they substantially affect the revenues of the United States
because they are afforded preferential Federal tax treatment; that
despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with
long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement
benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans;
that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the
soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to
pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the
termination of plans before requisite funds have been
accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been
deprived of anticipated benefits...;
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect
interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure
and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and
other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards
of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans, and by providing
for appropriate
to the Federal courts.
remedies, sanctions, and ready access
2.

Health Benefits

In the legislative history of the Act, no such similar Congressional
findings and declaration of policy concerning health care benefits are to be
found. In contrast to pensions, little debate concerned health care, and
Congress did not consider any in-depth instrumental action in this area. As
Professor Catherine Fisk explains:
Congress gave relatively little thought to the problem of health
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).

86

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4.1

benefits, apart from joint union-employer Taft-Hartley funds,
because the highly publicized problems in welfare benefits were
mainly fraud.., in the administration of union funds .... But the
sharp increases in health care costs that would reveal the
incongruence between
employer and employee interests were still
84
some years away.
Indeed, some have viewed ERISA's regulations governing employee
health coverage as an unintended consequence of the statute. Now,
however, this is an area that has obtained a broad consensus for reform.
3.

Preemption

ERISA has broad preemption language to guarantee interstate
consistency, something the Supreme Court has called the legislation's
"crowning achievement. ' 5 ERISA's preemption provision states: "[T]he
insofar as
provisions [of ERISA]... shall supersede any and all State laws
'8 6
plan."
benefit
employee
any
to
relate
hereafter
or
now
they may
In fashioning federal common law under ERISA, the federal courts
have borrowed from existing state common law fiduciary principles, but
they do not apply state law to ERISA provisions. Federal courts apply the
same principles to ERISA that they have to other federal labor statutes:
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state
law .... But state law, if compatible with the purpose [of the
Act], may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best
effectuate the federal policy .... Any state law applied,
however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an
independent source of private rights.8 7
The practical application of preemption and its detrimental affect on
employees are examined in Sections II and IV below in the discussions of
fiduciary duties under ERISA, and health benefit cases, respectively.

84. Fisk, supra note 40, at 165-66.
85. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1987).
86. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2001). Exempt from preemption is any state
law that regulates insurance, banking, or securities. This is provided by the "savings clause"
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). Yet this is also modified by what is called the
"deemer clause," which states that "[n]either an employee benefit plan.., nor any trust
under such plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer.., for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance." 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(B) (1994). Thus, even self-funded health benefit plans are wholly governed by
ERISA. See generally ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1994).
87. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,457 (1957).
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II.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER ERISA

A.

The "Exclusive Benefit" Rule: Solely in the Interest of Participants
and Beneficiaries?

Pension assets are to be invested solely for the benefit of the plan's
participants. As one certified financial advisor asserts adamantly, pension
assets are to be invested: "[n]ot for the benefit of the company; not for the
benefit of senior executives; and not to advance the careers or personal
wealth of company employees".S
Whether for pension plans or health plans, ERISA provides that:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participantsand beneficiariesand(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to the participants and their
beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like
aims .... S9
A dense body of law addresses fiduciary status, which is beyond the
scope of this article. For present purposes, ERISA jurisprudence has
divided its world into two spheres of action: fiduciary functions and
administrative (including settlor) functions. The Act defines a fiduciary as
a person who "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management" of a plan, or "exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets."90 Any person who
does not exercise this control, and is not a "named fiduciary," does not owe
a fiduciary duty in his undertakings vis h vis the plan.9' Courts analyze
fiduciary and administrative functions and apply this analysis to determine
the status of the fiduciary or non-fiduciary. This status is outcome

88.

JAMES

A.

KUJACA, THE TRILLION DOLLAR PROMISE: AN INSIDE LOOK AT CORPORATE

PENSION MONEY, How IT'S MANAGED, AND FOR WHOSE BENEFIT 19 (1996).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(21)(A) (2001).
91. ERISA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2001).
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determinative because if a person is adjudicated to be a fiduciary under the
functional test, a duty is owed to the employees as an expression of their
rights. If that person's actions do not confer fiduciary status, employees
lack substantive rights.
As noted, under basic trust law, the owner of the property, or the
settlor of the trust, may convey property to a third party or a trustee for the
benefit of a beneficiary. Imposing a fiduciary duty prevents the trustee
from engaging in self-dealing. Fiduciary duties were also imposed under
the earliest benefit plans in the form of trusts. "Thus, ERISA in some
respects was nothing more radical than a federal codification of the existing
regulatory and contractual practices, not a dramatic reform. 92 However,
unlike traditional trust practices, under ERISA there is no per se prohibition
or presumption of wrong-doing in those instances where a fiduciary is also
the settlor. The conflict of interest for employers is acknowledged, but
given comparatively little attention. Although ERISA "occupies the field"
and preempts state law, as noted above, the federal courts have had to
fashion a federal common law of fiduciary duties where no specific
provision of the act applies.93
Once a position of dual loyalties is sanctioned, as it is under ERISA, it
can be very difficult to determine whether: (1) a fiduciary breached his or
her duty of loyalty to plan beneficiaries (an ERISA violation); or (2) a
fiduciary has merely made a mistake in judgment or made a reasonable
investment or taken a reasonable action that did not turn out as intended
(probably not an ERISA violation).94 However, result measurement is not
the appropriate test under ERISA, because even if self-dealing gives rise to
substantially higher returns for a plan investment, a fiduciary breach may
have occurred.95 Professor Wohl contends that "the yardstick by which
behavior is determined appropriate or inappropriate under ERISA, as
opposed to traditional trust law, is the measure of the impact that a
fiduciary's existing conflicts have on the decision-making process rather
96
than the mere determination of the existence of a conflict of interest.,
Wohl also laments that "ERISA legislation provides no mechanism for
92. Fisk, supra note 40, at 165.
93. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Trans., Inc., 472
U.S. 559, 570 (1985) ("Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general
scope of [ERISA fiduciaries'] authority and responsibility."); Milwaukee v. Illinois &
Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1981) ("Federal courts. . . are not general common law courts
and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision...
[However,] [wihen Congress has not spoken to a particular issue.., the Court has found it
necessary, in a 'few and restricted' instances.., to develop federal common law.").
94. Laurence B. Wohl, FiduciaryDuties UnderERISA: A Tale of Multiple Loyalties, 20
DAYTON L. REV. 43, 47 (1994).
95. The leading case enunciating this rule is Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir.
1978).
96. Wohl, supra note 94, at 52.
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assessing the motivational factors of a plan fiduciary's actions," suggesting97
that the fiduciary labors under a cloud of mistrust that hinders his actions.
Wohl believes that the fiduciary should be "assured a benign assessment by
third parties of the motivational factors underlying the fiduciary's act."9'
The fiduciary has no reason to be concerned. The cloud of mistrust
hovered initially because, historically, employers were motivated to control
the supply and tenure of their workforce-before age discrimination was
prohibited. 99 But, even now, under ERISA, no one lays claim to pension
plans being redistributive or altruistic in nature. Moreover, in the Pegram
case, the Supreme Court has assured fiduciaries that the justices may
disregard the conflicts of interest that may motivate a particular fiduciary

act.
How benefits are characterized does, however, affect assessment of
employer motivations. An inconsistency has prevailed in the identification
of pension monies as either deferred wages earned by workers or
something more akin to a voluntary perk gifted over by employers.1"'
Models of wage and benefit packages identify pension monies as deferred
wages.1 O' Unless such monies are "vested," the jurisprudence of ERISA
refuses to confer beneficiaries' substantive rights. Indeed, health benefits
do not vest; otherwise, employers would be prevented from reducing

97. Id. at 49.
98. Id.
99. Life expectancy in the U.S. has expanded tremendously, such that, until relatively
recently, most people died while still working or after a brief incapacitation. Employers
often seek to replace older workers through incentives such as early retirement, particularly
now, since the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") prohibits "arbitrary" age
discrimination in employment and outlaws mandatory retirement. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623,
631 (2001). See also Munnell, supra note 63, at 77-78.
100. INTERmi REPORT OF ACTIrVTIES OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN
STUDY, S. REP. No. 92-634, at 75 (2d Sess. 1972).
101. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics study, wage inequality understates
compensation inequality. BROOKS PIERCE, COMPENSATION INEQUALITY 1 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Working Paper No. 323, 1999). Pension and retirement
savings plans are less prevalent than health insurance. Id. at 6. Defined benefit plans are
present 35.7% of the time, while defined contribution plans, which include 401(k) plans and
deferred profit sharing plans (with positive employer payments), are present 40.9% of the
time. Id. The cost of pension plans is more difficult to project. For defined benefit plans, it
is approximately $0.78 an hour. Id. at 7.
"Insurance consists primarily of health insurance, and accounts for 5.8% of
compensation costs. The health insurance component itself accounts for $1.15 per hour in
compensation costs, roughly comparable to average social security costs. The health
insurance benefits coverage figure is 73.1% in these data," which is somewhat larger than
other statistics. Id. at 6. The Bureau of Labor Statistics study concludes, "[c]ompensation
inequality rose of the past ten to fifteen years by a greater amount than did wage inequality.
The differences are apparent mainly in the bottom half of the respective distributions, and
are largely due to declines in health insurance coverage rates." Id. at 31.
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03
them. m2 No fiduciary breach flows from a reduction in such benefits.
From the employee's perspective, the contributions to the pension
fund are part of her compensation and the value flows from her to the
extent it represents deferred compensation.
From the employer's
perspective, the contribution flows from the employer, and cannot be
equated with a separate investment by the employee.1 4 There is a dual
rationale for a pension plan-deferred wages for employees and an
incentive utilized by employers to retain workers in order to achieve their
vesting periods. The dominant paradigm in ERISA jurisprudence endorses
the latter.
For Professors Fischel and Langbein, law and economics adherents,
this dual rationale makes ERISA chafe under the "exclusive benefit"
rule.105 Law and economics promotes the view that judges should
determine cases with a view towards economic efficiency, striving to
imitate a perfectly operating market. 6 Regulations, the theory goes, can
hamper efficiency by placing too large a burden on business, which can
always bargain with those affected (e.g., by pollution, or, here, fiduciary
breaches). 0 7 Here, Fischel and Langbein argue that, since both employees
and employers benefit from the pension or welfare benefit plan, there is an
"obvious" difficulty with interpreting the "exclusive benefit" rule.'0 s They
contend that these plans are established for the mutual advantage of both
employer and employee, not for the "exclusive benefit" of one. This
renders the "exclusive benefit" rule "inconsistent with the economic
realities of the plans."' 19 If we consider the Supreme Court's articulation of
the economic realities of HMO-based employee welfare benefit plans in
Pegram, it appears that the high court was influenced by such theories.
A concept related to the "exclusive benefit" rule is that of "prohibited
transactions." Under ERISA § 406:
(1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the Plan to
engage in a transaction, ifhe knows or should know that such

102. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 981 (1992); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir.
1988).
103. Id.
104. Cf.International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560-61 (1977) ("[Ilt
seems clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making
an investment ....)
105. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (1988).
106. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1977).
107. Id. See also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I
(1960). The thrust of the Coase theorem is that except where transition costs are quite high,
the role of law should not be setting rights and entitlements.
108. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 105.
109. Id.
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transaction constitutes a direct or indirect(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between
the plan and a party in interest;
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the
plan and a party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of a party in
interest, of any assets of the plan; or
(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own
interest or for his own account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act
in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of
a party.. .whose interests are adverse to the
interests of the plan or the interests of its
participants or beneficiaries." 0
Section 3(14) of ERISA defines a party in interest as any fiduciary to
the plan, any service provider to the plan, the employer sponsoring the
plan, a union whose employees participate in the plan, or an owner of fifty
percent or more of the company sponsor.'
The legal fiction of corporate
personality operates here, in that a fiduciary may be an entity, and not a
person.
B.

The Tension Between FiduciaryDuties and the Settlor Function in
ERISA Jurisprudence

The dichotomy between fiduciary duties and settlor functions under
ERISA is based upon the voluntary nature of employee benefits under the
statute.' Employers, in their fiduciary capacity, have a duty to adhere to
the "exclusive benefit" rule, and yet they have no duty to provide any
benefits at all, which gives them broad discretion in their settlor or
administrative capacities, with no duty to anyone but shareholders.
These conflicting duties have given rise to several tendencies in
judicial decision-making. Since fiduciary breaches fall under the law of
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2001) (emphasis added).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(14) (2001).
112. As of 1997, 69% of regular full-time workers received health insurance from their
employers; 60.3% of regular full-time workers have an employer-based pension. THE STATE
OF WORKING AMERICA 1998-1999 (1999).
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equity, there is no right to a jury trial in ERISA cases." 3 According to
some practitioners, federal judges have embedded in their decisions a fear
that if they too enthusiastically extend protection to employees, increases in4
the cost of benefits to employers will result in a cancellation of benefits."1
Even if this approach is based on pragmatic concerns, it is reasonable to
question the rationale behind these judicial decisions.
Although the Supreme Court directed the federal courts to develop a
federal common law of rights and obligations in this area, the lower federal
courts have resisted.' '5 They have ignored common law remedies and
doctrines, such as implied contract, estoppel, fraud, and negligence, and
determined that they are all state law remedies preempted by ERISA. The
6
substantive "
result is a narrow definition of rights, more procedural than

Ill. PENSION BENEFITS CASES

Because employee benefit trusts are freely revocable, the U.S.
Department of Labor has taken the position that discretionary activities that
relate to the formation, rather than the management of plans, including
decisions concerning the "establishment, termination, and design of plans
are not fiduciary activities subject to ...ERISA."''17 For some, this is an
obvious position to take. "There can be no doubt that applying fiduciary
standards about plan design and termination-that is, demanding that such
decisions be made for the 'exclusive purpose' of benefiting participants and
beneficiaries-is radically inconsistent with 'the voluntary nature of the
private pension system."""' These same commentators disagree, however,
with the Labor Department's position that certain actions normally taken in
connection with plan termination do entail discretionary authority giving
rise to fiduciary responsibility under the "exclusive benefit" rule. 1 9 They
contend that the Labor Department's position "fails to observe the
113. The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution provides that "in Suits at common
law.. .the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Since
breaches of fiduciary duties sound in equity, not the common law, there is no right to a jury
trial in ERISA cases. This has additional adverse affects, such as precluding damages. See,
e.g., Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094, 1096 (6th Cir. 1990) (there is no express
statutory right to a jury trial and no evidence of congressional intent to grant the right to a
jury trial on ERISA claims). See also Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions
Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARV. L, REV.737, 738, 741-43 (1983).
114. Henry H. Rossbacher, et al., ERISA's Dark Side: Retiree Health Benefits, False
Employer Promises andthe ProtectiveJudiciary,9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 305, 308 (1997).
115. Id. at 322-33 and cases cited therein.
116. Id. at331.
117. THOMAS E. VEAL & EDWARD R. MACKIEWICZ, PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS 330
(1998) (quoting Dept. of Labor opinion letter of March 13, 1986).
118. Id. at330-31.
119. Id. at331.
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distinction between making judgments and following legal rules. ' 2 °
In the last three years, the Supreme Court has twice held that an
amendment to an ERISA plan does not implicate fiduciary duties under the
Act when it arguably should have. Moreover, the present Court decides
few cases unanimously; it is often divided ideologically, with 5-4
decisions.' 2' Yet, in these two ERISA decisions, the Court ruled 9-0 and 72 (the two representing concurring opinions with only partial dissents).
Even more remarkably, Justice Thomas, the least prolific opinion writer on
the Court, authored both opinions.
A.

Lockheed v. Spink: Take Your Gold Watch and Leave

The 1996 Supreme Court case, Lockheed Corp. v. Spink,2 2 allowed
the payment of benefits under an early retirement program to be
conditioned on the participants' release of employment related legal claims
against the company sponsor. 123
Paul Spink worked for Lockheed from 1939-50, and then departed. In
1979, when Spink was sixty-one, Lockheed persuaded him to return,
however, Lockheed's defined benefit pension plan excluded employees
over the age of sixty.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
("OBRA"),' 124 which prohibits age-based exclusions from participation in
pension plans similar to Lockheed's.'23 To comply with the law, Lockheed
in 1988 amended its pension plan, but when Spink retired, Lockheed
limited the years of service used in computing his benefit accruals to those
after December 25, 1988, when it amended the plan. In short, the amended
plan only credited those workers over sixty with their number of years of
service commencing on December 25, 1988.
In 1990, before Spink's retirement, Lockheed pursued cost-cutting
measures and offered incentives for early retirement. The company offered
Spink and other older employees an extra three years of credited service if
they would sign a general release in favor of Lockheed on all employment
litigation claims they might have against the company, including claims
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down, by a 5-4 vote, the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on grounds Congress overstepped its bounds
under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. I. § 8); see also Holmes, Kaiser,
Kramer, and Dworkin articles cited supra note 14.
122. 517 U.S. 882 (1996).
123. Id. at 884.
124. Pub. L. 99-509 (1986).
125. ERISA had permitted these exclusions. ERISA was thus amended, and the statute
now states that "[n]o pension plan may exclude from participation (on the basis of age)
employees who have attained a specified age." 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (2001).
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under ERISA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"). 126 Spink refused to sign the waiver, and thus was deprived of
these benefits-which were not insignificant at $10,000 a year.
The question presented to the Court was, "Can an ERISA plan require
additional, non-incidental consideration from the employee running in
favor of the employer in exchange for the payment of benefits from trust
assets without violating ERISA's prohibited transaction rule?"' 27 The
prohibited transaction rule comes into play on the theory that Lockheed
engaged in a self-interested transaction: the company dictated that the use
of trust assets to pay the extra incentive benefits be conditioned on certain
waivers. As the Ninth Circuit explained, Lockheed was offering to "writ[e]
checks drawn on pension funds to buy the releases in question" for itself. 8
It concluded, "Lockheed cannot avoid the
prohibitions of ERISA by
29
writing an amendment instead of a check.'
In an amicus brief, the American Association of Retired Persons
("AARP") explained that it was illegal for the plan to pay for these
releases:
An early retirement incentive program provides the employer
with the value of reducing its workforce. Payment of enhanced
pension benefits to entice employees to leave is permissible as
part of the employment paradigm. However, an employee's
release of employment claims is an additional and distinct benefit
that is not inherent in the employee's departure. Thus, if the
employer wants a release of such claims, it can provide additional
consideration from its corporate funds. The only issue here is
who can legally pay for the releases-the employer or the plan. 30
Since Lockheed was the sponsor of the plan, it was a party in interest.
The transaction was prohibited because Lockheed used pension monies to
purchase something that inured only to its benefit, not to the benefit of
participants and beneficiaries, nor to the trust itself. While the Supreme
Court did not dwell on the issues, because the benefit was enjoyed solely
by the employer sponsor, both the "exclusive benefit" rule and the duty of
loyalty that are so unstable under ERISA were implicated.
Spink, who refused to waive any of his ADEA or ERISA claims
against the company, brought suit alleging that Lockheed and its board of
directors breached their duty of care to participants by making plan
provisions conditional. Curiously, the case did not address in any
126. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2001).
127. Spink v. Lockheed, 60 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1995).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 623-24.
130. Brief of Amicus Curiae AARP in Support of Respondent, 1996 WL 154237 at 28
(U.S. Amicus Brief).
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significant
way that the waiver could be invalid as violative of public
13 1
policy.
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court observed, "[n]othing
in ERISA requires employers to establish employee benefits plans. Nor
does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if they
choose to have such a plan." 132
Despite citing language in a
contemporaneous decision that would have supported the imposition of
fiduciary duties based on Lockheed's uncontroverted actions alone ("it may
be true that amending or terminating a plan.., cannot be an act of plan
'management' or 'administration"'), the Court placed the burden of further
proof on the beneficiary. 133 Spink had to prove that Lockheed was engaged
in self-dealing, a prohibited transaction under ERISA. 34 This is a
significant departure from traditional trust law doctrine, which requires the
mere appearance of impropriety to be explained by a trustee. The Supreme
Court said:
Spink concedes.. .that among the 'incidental' and thus
legitimate benefits that a plan sponsor may receive from the
operation of a pension plan are attracting and retaining
employees, paying deferred compensation, settling or avoiding
strikes, providing increased compensation without increasing
wages, increasing employee turnover, and reducing the likelihood
of lawsuits by encouraging employees
who would otherwise have
35
been laid off to depart voluntarily.1
Justice Thomas continued, "[w]e do not see how obtaining waivers of
employment-related claims can meaningfully be distinguished from these
admittedly permissible objectives., 136 In language reminiscent of early
twentieth century labor cases, 37 Justice Thomas asserts, "[t]he employer
can ask the employee to continue to work for the employer, to cross a
131. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 702-04 (1945) (noting that
"the statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be
waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy," and ruling
that employees could not waive their private rights to liquidated damages because of the
public policy interest at stake).
132. Lockheed v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996).
133. Id. at 890 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)).
134. Id. at 893-94.
135. Id. at 893.
136. Id. at 894.
137. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (finding that a state law prohibiting
employers from barring employees from joining labor unions violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down
legislation forbidding employer discrimination against union members as interfering with
liberty of contract); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (determining that a law
limiting total work hours of bakers interfered with constitutionally protected liberty interest
of freedom of contract between employer and employee).
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picket line, or to retire early."' 138 He concludes, "[t]here is no basis in...
[ERISA] for distinguishing a valid from an invalid quid pro quo.139
Justice Thomas adds,
"[t]he private parties, not the Government, control the
140
level of benefits."'

In another context, Professor Catherine Fisk observes:
[w]hat remains is a legal guarantee of unrestrained managerial
power ... The irony is that the courts have resurrected contract in
all its laissez faire and formalist glory under the aegis of
legislation which was at least nominally supposed to protect
employees against the exercise of14 private power that nineteenthcentury contract law had allowed.'
During the oral argument, Justice Scalia was preoccupied with the
voluntarist aspect of ERISA, peppering the attorneys with questions about
employer obligations and employee motivations:
He [the employer] doesn't have to set up the plan anyway, and he
can terminate it at any time, so he can make it conditional on
anything that isn't criminal.
How do you get that distinction out of Section ... 406 [that a
waiver for prior defamation claims, sex discrimination claims,
toxic tort claims violates ERISA]?
The promise of benefits attracts the employee, but not the
payment itself, because
at the time payment is made the person is
42
a former employee.1
The arguments expose a fundamental disagreement about the
definition of a pension. Congressional proponents of the legislation argued
143
that pensions are part of an employee's salary that may be collected later.
But for Justice Scalia, the employee's consideration should not figure into
the equation because he is a former employee by the time he receives a

138. Lockheed, 517 U.S. at 894.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. Fisk, supra note 40, at 155-56.
142. Official Transcript at 31-33, Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 887 (1996) (No.
95-809).
143. For example, in the brief for Mr. Spink, his counsel cited Congressional proponents
of the legislation: "Pensions are not gratuities, like a gold watch bestowed as a gift by the
employer on retirement. They represent savings which the worker has earned in the form of
deferred payment for his labors" (Senator Williams); "The private pension plan is a means
for transferring earnings during the working years into income for a decent living in the
older years. The worker 'works' for that pension the same way he 'works' for his wages or
salary" (Senator Javits). Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Employment Lawyers Assoc.
at 3 n.2, Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 887 (1996) (No. 95-809) (supporting Paul
Spink et al.).
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pension.
Above all, actions related to the establishment, amendment, or
termination of a plan are deemed to be administrative and therefore, nonfiduciary in nature. This has grave implications for numerous areas of law,
including tort, contract, and civil rights.
Under Justice Scalia's
construction of the statute, an employer could mandate, for example, that
particular groups of employees who are more prone to suffer from
particular diseases cannot file suit under a plan for violations of the ADA,
that Blacks alone cannot sue for race discrimination, that women alone
cannot sue for sex discrimination. Moreover, rather than being hostile to
the legislation in the contractarian and traditional sense of laissez faire, it is
apparent that the Court finds this legislation accommodating precisely
because of its voluntaristic and contractual underpinnings.
B.

Hughes Aircraft v. Jacobson:The Company Benefits, Not You

Again in 1999, the employees in Hughes Aircraft lost before the
Supreme Court to another major defense contractor after attaining a
temporary victory in the Ninth Circuit.' 44 The employees had hoped to
steer clear of the problems created by Lockheed, where the plan was funded
solely by employer contributions. In contrast, Hughes Aircraft's plan was
funded by both employer and employee contributions. The strategy was to
argue that the "interest" (as in "solely in the interest of' participants and
beneficiaries) was more pronounced since the participants' stake in plan
funds was a traceable ownership interest rather than a right based upon
employer contributions.
Unlike benefits earned from employer
contributions, an employee is automatically vested in his or her
contributions. 45 Thus, where Lockheed failed, with stricter scrutiny, the
Hughes plaintiffs might prevail.
The details of Hughes are as follows: Hughes had sponsored the
pension plan since 1955, which required mandatory contributions from all
participating employees, in addition to any contributions made by Hughes.
By 1986, as a result of both employer and employee contributions and
investment growth, the plan's assets exceeded the then-present value of
accrued benefits by almost one billion dollars. After Hughes was acquired
by General Motors in 1987, it ceased making contributions, in part because
of the over-funding. 46 The employees, however, were required to continue
144. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 105 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S.
432 (1999).
145. ERISA § 203(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(1) (1994). The accrual of benefits is
different when they are derived from employee contributions rather than employer
contributions. ERISA § 204(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c) (1994).
146. Plaintiffs alleged that at the time General Motors acquired Hughes, the General
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to make their contributions. According to the Ninth Circuit, as of January
1992, half the surplus in the Contributory Plan was attributable to
47
employee contributions, and half to employer contributions. 1
The company used the plan's surplus assets-again, attributable in
part to the employees' contributions-and amended the plan to fund an
early retirement program for existing employees, while also allowing new
employees who were not participants of the original contributory plan to
participate on a different, non-contributory basis. The employees from the
original plan charged Hughes Aircraft with violating its fiduciary duties,
including the anti-inurement provision of ERISA. That provision states
148
that "assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer.'
The provision reaches all employers, whether they are acting in a fiduciary
capacity or not. There is no limiting language of the type explained above
49
under fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions.
The district court dismissed the employees' complaint, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 50 According to the appeals court, the amendment of the
plan could have constituted the de facto creation of two plans because the
plan before and after the "amendment" was considerably different. 5 ' The
Lockheed case was inapposite because ERISA's anti-inurement provision
applies whether the employer is acting in a "settlor" or a "fiduciary"
capacity. 15 When both an employer and its employees contribute to a
pension plan, limits are imposed upon the employer. It does not have sole
discretion to use that part of the plan's asset surplus attributable to
employee contributions to benefit itself as well as employees who were
never participants in the plan. Here, the Ninth Circuit addressed the real
world economy: "Hughes, in effect, remained competitive in the labor
market by using the asset surplus, created in part by employee
contributions, to reduce its labor costs and increase new employees'
wages.' 53 The Court went on to observe that, "when an employer amends
a plan to use for its own benefit an asset surplus attributable in part to
employee contributions, the employer is wearing both its 'fiduciary' and its
'employer' hats.'

54

The language of the dissent, portending the Supreme Court decision to
Motors retirement plan was underfunded by over seven billion dollars. The Ninth Circuit
noted that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation "listed the GM plan as one of the most
underfunded pension plans in the country." Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d at 1291 n.2.
147. Id. at 1291.
148. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2001).
149. Id.
150. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d at 1288.
151. Id. at 1291-95.
152. Id. at 1296.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1297.
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come, was saturated with hostility towards the employees. Justice Norris,
the author of the dissent, made the employees out to be gold-diggers.
Notwithstanding that the case was certified as a class action, Justice Norris
questioned whether the five bringing suit "among the 10,000-plus Hughes
employees and retirees participating" could represent the class.155 Justice
Norris stated that:
In the event that plaintiffs succeed in their quest for a judgment
terminating the Plan.. .plaintiffs will receive not only the
benefits which they are currently receiving but also a share of the
$1 billion surplus. That is the pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow that drives this litigation. 56
Justice Norris complained of limits upon employers' unfettered
discretion-limits that ERISA imposes: "[t]oday's decision announces that
in the Ninth Circuit there are severe, if vague and ill-defined, restrictions
on the discretion of employers charged as plan settlors under ERISA with
responsibility for the design of qualified pension plans.' 57 Finally, Justice
Norris appealed to Congress:
If ERISA is in need of clarifying or restricting amendments to the
provisions relating to the authority of employers as settlors to
design pension15plans, that need should be addressed by Congress,
not this court. 9
However, Judge Norris's colleagues on the Ninth Circuit had no
difficulty resolving the dispute by looking to the plain meaning of the
statute:
At the heart of this dispute is whether Hughes is entitled to use
and control for its own benefit the Contributory Plan's one billion
dollar surplus, approximately one half of which was generated by
employee contributions. This is not a case in which the pension
plan... was funded entirely by employer contributions. Nor is
this a case in which the employer used the plan's asset surplus
solely to benefit participants of the plan. Because plaintiffs
allege that the employer used the Contributory Plan's asset
surplus attributable in part to employee contributions for its own
benefit and for the benefit of employees who were never
that plaintiffs
participants in the Contributory Plan, we conclude
59
have stated cognizable claims under ERISA.
The Supreme Court eventually returned to the question whether under
these facts a new plan had been created or one plan had been amended.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1303.
1312-13.
1313.
1292.
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In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
snuffed out the possibility of distinguishing Lockheed. 16 In ordering the
case to be dismissed, the Supreme Court, an appellate tribunal, usurped the
role of the fact-finder in making this determination. The Ninth Circuit had
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case, effectively ordering the
district court to proceed with discovery and trial; or at least determine at a
future date, predicated upon the facts not being in dispute, whether
summary judgment would be appropriate. The threshold to obtain one's
"day in court" is low. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the employees'
complaint alleged cognizable claims. Indeed, a party need not establish at
the outset that it can win the case, only that it has pleaded the correct law to
resolve the matter and that the facts alleged, taken in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff, could support a claim for relief.
Yet the Supreme Court
ignored how different the "before" and "after" plans were and held that it
was not even a question of fact whether two plans, disguised as one, were
at issue. The Court avoided the facts and argued the law. It held that
ERISA does not distinguish the type of plan involved when judging plan
sponsors who alter the terms of a plan as settlors or administrators, not
fiduciaries. The Court also rejected the employees' suggestion that, since
they contributed to the plan's corpus, they should be regarded as cosettlors: "'the settlor of a trust is the person who intentionally causes it to
come into existence' ... Certainly, respondents do not contend that they
are responsible for the creation of the Plan.'

62

The so-called liberals on

the bench, Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, 63 adhered not
only to the result, but to this very reasoning; otherwise, they would have
filed concurring opinions, if not dissents.
All of the justices thus aligned themselves with the employer, Hughes
Aircraft. There may be a legitimate question whether ERISA enunciates or
establishes a social or legal consensus as to whose expectations to protect,
but the justices do seem to impose their own views, rather than any
objective "law" as to whose rights take precedent.' 64 Yet the text of the
160. Unlike in Lockheed, where it took a side, in Hughes Aircraft, the American
Association of Retired Persons ("AARP"), of more than thirty million Americans age fifty
or older, submitted a brief amicus curiae "in support of neither party." Essentially, AARP
asked the Supreme Court for more definitive guidelines for analyzing "fiduciary breach
allegations arising from the employer's plan amendment." Brief of Amicus Curiae of
AARP at 7, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999) (No. 97-1287)
(supporting neither party).
161. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1202, 1205, 1207, 1215-25,
1228 (2d 1990).
162. Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 445 n.5, (quoting G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES §1 (2d ed. 1984)).
163. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 14, at 53-54 (discussing the alignment of the Court).
164. See Fisk, supra note 40, at 233.
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statute itself provides a sufficient basis for a correct disposition without
resort to such personal preferences. Justice Thomas must know that
defined-benefit plans are likely to be funded by employees, not just their
employer. However, he emphasizes the differences between a definedbenefit and defined-contribution plan by drawing our attention to the
employer's burden in defined-benefit plans: "[T]he employer typically
bears the entire investment risk and-short of the consequences of plan
termination-must cover any underfunding as the result of a shortfall that
may occur from the plan's investments."1 65 Justice Thomas then states the
obvious fact that if the plan is overfunded, the employer is free to reduce or
suspend contributions. Justice Thomas asserts, "[employees'] vestedbenefits and anti-inurement claims proceed on
the erroneous assumption
166
surplus."
Plan's
the
in
interest
an
had
that they
The Court found that the employees enjoyed no such interest in the
surplus because the "1991 amendment did not affect the rights of preexisting Plan participants and Hughes did not use the surplus for its own
benefit."' 67 This rationale is emblematic of what Elizabeth Mensch has
called the "justificatory language of the law."' 65 ERISA cases may be
decided through formalism, but that does not mean that the judge does not
have discretion to make moral choices about the obligations of employer
and employee. 69
These cases reflect a formalistic, if not circular, definition of what
implicates a fiduciary duty under ERISA1 70 And yet, they ignore
formalism as to the "exclusive benefit" rule. Moreover, they overlook that
one of the purposes of ERISA was to modify traditional trust law's
emphasis on settlor instructions, which is "insufficient to adequately
protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries."' 71 The Supreme
Court swept aside the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit as if it were nothing
but a panel of first-year law students laboring under misapprehension, or
worse, foolish and untutored in ERISA law. To the Supreme Court, the
"natural" and reasonable conclusion is that one plan exists. Whether the
employer acted for the exclusive benefit of participants begs the question,
"Could the Court have done anything different?" Obviously, it could have.
It could have ruled that there were two plans.
165. Hughes Aircraft, 525 U.S. at 439.
166. Id. at 438.
167. Id. at 439.
168. Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLMCS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 13 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
169. See Fisk, supra note 40, at 233 (arguing that judges have the task to make value
choices and factual inquiries in ERISA litigation).
170. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
171. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1974), reprintedin 1973 WL 12549, at *38; S. REP. No. 93127 (1974), reprintedin 1973 WL 12550, at *71.
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To bolster the legitimacy of its one-plan holding and its invocation of
employer objectives, the Court maintained that employees would be better
off in the long run with the regime of an unfettered right of employers to
amend a plan. Paternalism aside, these employees argued that they would,
in fact, be worse off within such a regime.
In promoting a constitutive approach to the law, some scholars have
addressed, in a parallel way, how legal practices "are a part of our culture,
part of our nature,"' 172 and test the "reach of law into social and political
life.' 7' A constitutive approach argues against a claim "that laws either
determine or fully encompass politics, but rather that they become part of
politics in more than an instrumental way."' 74 A constitutive approach to
ERISA suggests that the power and legal meanings of pension security are
produced within the acceptable paradigm of mobile capital and unlimited
discretion to amend a plan. Here, the social and political relations of
capitalist society are thus presented as not only natural and universal, but
best for workers. 75 At the same time, the theory claims that labor, with the
ability to "enter and exit" has an equal role in determining its own security.
In the next section, I explore ERISA cases involving health benefits and
examine how the statute has become part of the politics of health care in
the U.S., and has reached into our collective social, political, and moral
life.
IV. THE DENIAL OF HEALTH BENEFITS AND THE "ExcLusIVE BENEFIT"
RULE

A.

Individual vs. Corporate "Group" Rights

None of the following patients or their survivors would have makewhole remedies under ERISA. All of these wrongful death or malpractice
claims would be preempted:
1. A woman had a history of difficult pregnancies. Her doctor
recommended bed rest during the final months of her pregnancy.
Toward the very end of her pregnancy, her doctor recommended
hospitalization.
The managed care plan's pre-certification
utilization reviewers determined that hospitalization was not
necessary and only authorized ten hours per day of home nursing
care. When no nurse was on duty, the fetus went into distress

172. BRIGHAM, supra note 17, at 3.
173. Id (citing Kare, supra note 26, at 122).
174. Id. at 4.
175. ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW
THEORY OF LAW 34 (1993).
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176

2. A woman seeks a bone marrow transplant to aggressively
treat advanced breast cancer. Her doctor recommends the
treatment, but administrators in the HMO say the treatment is too
experimental and refuse pre-certification. She cannot otherwise
afford the177treatment and haggles for months with the HMO until
she dies.
3. A sixty-two year-old man is on vacation 500 miles from his
HMO. He suffers severe chest pains and is rushed to the
emergency room. Expensive tests conclude he only had a severe
case of indigestion. The HMO refuses to pay for the tests.
4. A woman has surgery on her aorta. The treating physician
recommends an eight-day hospitalization stay. A consulting
utilization review physician states that four days must suffice.
The woman's treating physician did not register a complaint for
review of the denial and sends her home on the fourth day. She
develops an infection in her leg and must have it amputated."'
5. A business cannot pay its debts. It continues to deduct health
insurance premiums from employees' paychecks, but falls back
on its own contributions and fails to tell employees that their
health coverage is in jeopardy. The HMO fails to notify all
participants that it is canceling the group insurance. Meanwhile,
an employee's newborn baby suffers from a severe heart defect
and requires expensive treatment, which he gets at an HMOaffiliated hospital. The IMO realizes its "mistake," and cancels
coverage retroactively. The HMO duns the employee for years.
One collection agent even tells the man "you'd be better off if
your baby had died." The man's credit rating is ruined, he files
for bankruptcy and requires psychiatric care.
The 1993-94 Health Insurance Association of America's "Harry and
Louise" commercials were front-line weapons in the ideological war during

176. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
177. Several reported cases deal with a plaintiff's challenge to a denial of a bone marrow
transplant, and, in each, the court determined that the claims were preempted. See Bast v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 870 (1999);
Turner v. Fallon Comm. Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1072 (1998); Cannon v. Group Health Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (Ist Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 816 (1996).
178. The actual case is Wickline v. State, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986). Had this
woman been receiving treatment through an employer-sponsored plan, any malpractice
claim she may have had would have been preempted by ERISA.
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the first Clinton administration's attempt at health care reform.'79 The
advertisements, with their worried alerts of government intervention,
helped characterize the Clinton plan as "socialized medicine" that would
surely replace the Norman Rockwell family doctor with an inept,
indifferent bureaucracy. These commercials helped derail any chances of
reform. Times have changed, and health care reform has gotten Congress's
attention-even the Republicans' .80 But the extent to which citizen agency
and political organizing is responsible for this attention is unclear.
Citizenship has been privatized, and the plight patients face is often a
lonely test. Other than being plucked to serve as a prop at Congressional
hearings or to appear in a political advertisement, there is "no public sphere
in the contemporary United States, no context of communication and
debate that makes ordinary citizens feel that they have a common public
culture, or influence on a state that holds itself accountable to their
opinions, critical or otherwise."' 8' Even federal judges have decried their
own powerlessness. In one wrongful death case involving a managed care
facility's refusal to provide alcohol treatment and the patient's subsequent
suicide, the judge pleaded:
Although the alleged conduct of Travelers [the insurance
company] in this case is extraordinarily troubling, even more
disturbing to this court is the failure of Congress to amend a
statute that, due to the changing realities of the modem health
care system, has gone conspicuously
awry from its original
182
intent. Does anyone care? Do you?

The human interest story of a David/patient and Goliath/HMO may
make for good television, but the agency, citizenship, and class relations
operating "seem trite and unsexy."' 83 Nevertheless, the anecdotes have had
some impact, and Congress is listening, while some of its biggest campaign
finance donors, insurance companies, are apprehensive.
In January 2000, the Health Insurance Association of America
("HIAA") resurrected the Harry and Louise couple in new commercials.
Louise exclaims, "Forty-four million Americans without health insurance."
Harry bemoans, "That's huge. An epidemic." The kinder, gentler image of
179. The Health Insurance Corporation of America ran television advertisements in 1994
featuring the characters "Harry" and "Louise" lamenting what would happen under the
Clinton administrations proposed health care reform. See Elizabeth Kolbert, New Arena for
Campaign Ads: Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al; Elizabeth Kolbert, The Ad
Campaign: Playing on UncertaintiesAbout The Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993.
180. The House and Senate passed differing versions of patients' rights legislation over
the summer of 2001. See Marion Berry, How Patients' Rights Became a Fight, N.Y. TIMES.
Sept. 2, 2001, at A15.
181.

LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY

3 (1997).

182. Andrews-Clark v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 65 (D. Mass. 1997).
183. Id.
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HIAA is an unabashed effort to mute the call for HMO reform. 84 The
chief executives at fifteen of the largest managed-care companies have

been "meeting regularly since last fall [1999] to explore ways to improve
their companies' battered image. They are considering a $30 million to

$40 million campaign [to]... help limit fallout if a patients'-rights bill
passes. 'You need to have public approval and public trust,' says Roger
Bolton, a senior vice-president at Aetna Inc." 185
The hardest fought provision of any patients' rights legislation will be
over whether to allow patients under employer sponsored health plans to
recover against HMOs. 1 16 All the players have lined up. For example, the
Physician Insurers Association of America has urged Congress not to
repeal ERISA's preemption feature that prevents self-insured health care
plans from being sued for medical malpractice." 7
During the debates surrounding health care reform and patients'
rights, discussion of the role of the courts, the law, ethics and morality has
mostly been absent. It is the radical separation of law from morals.'8

What is the distinction between the law that is and law that ought to be
here? No penumbral question exists here. 189 In the cases explored, judges

could have appealed to the core meaning of a legal rule, the "exclusive
benefit" rule, without resort to the ideas, intentions, or expectations
subjectively held by the senators and congressmen who drafted and
promulgated ERISA. 90 The letter of the law applies and coincides with the
spirit of the law. But unlike constitutional law, with its rich normative
possibilities and penumbras, ERISA has no sex appeal.' 9'

184. This strategy is characterized as such by Lorraine Woellart, Suddenly, A Healthy
Shot at Health-CareReform, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 7, 2000, at 53.
185. Id.
186. Despite its name, The Federal HMO Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994), does not provide
HMO subscribers with substantial recourse when medical procedures or reimbursement for
outside treatment are denied. The Act's primary goal was to provide employees with the
option to sign up with an HMO. The statute and accompanying regulations, 47 C.F.R. §
417.150 (1994), et seq., do require "meaningful" grievance procedures, but not the right to
appeal for an impartial de novo review of an HMO decision. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(c)(5).
Another piece of federal legislation, intended to prevent patient dumping, the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), requires emergency rooms to treat
patients, but does not require HMO reimbursement. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. So much for
"managed care" meeting unplanned emergencies.
187. Mary Jane Fisher, Doctors Look to Protect ERISA Exemption, 102 NAT'L
UNDERWRITER 6 (1998).
188. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED,
(1995)(1 832); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958).
189. See Hart,supra note 188, at 615.
190. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 65 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
191. See Frederick Schauer, SPECIAL ISSUE: JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING:
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Jonathan Simon has analyzed how seemingly neutral actuarial
practices constitute components of a social ordering regime. 92 The
unobtrusiveness of these practices "is precisely why they have become so
important; they make power more effective and efficient by diminishing its
political and moral fallout."1 93 As shown in the next section, echoing the
judge quoted above, a recurring theme of ERISA preemption decisions is
that courts remain powerless to change the situation. Employers and
employees are categorized into neutral-sounding "plan sponsors" and "plan
participants." As Simon notes, "[s]ocial policy is inevitably ideological not
only in its substantive goals, but in the techniques through which it is
realized; every way of organizing
and managing people produces
'194
are.'
they
who
of
representations
B.

ERISA Coverage and the Problems of Preemption

ERISA covers employee welfare benefit plans that are "plan[s],
fund[s] or program[s] established or maintained" by an employer "for the
purpose of providing for its participants ...

through the purchase of

insurance or otherwise" medical or other benefits. 95 ERISA preempts state
laws that "relate to any employee benefit plan."' 96 Its preemptive effect is
also felt because it provides a federal cause of action "to recover benefits
due... under the terms of [the] plan, or to clarify ... rights to future
benefits.' 97 Thus, had the woman who needed the bone marrow transplant
in the fact scenario above been receiving treatment through an employersponsored plan, any malpractice claim she may have had would be
preempted by ERISA.
Common law causes of action to right the wrongs described in the
narratives above might include: medical malpractice and negligence,
tortious interference with the doctor-patient relationship, negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, loss of
consortium, and fraudulent and deceptive trade practices. Yet, these are all
preempted by ERISA. The effect of ERISA preemption is not to convert
Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1455, 1468 n.54 (1995):
Although I am sure there are people who find the intricacies of ERISA law
fascinating, I am not one of them. If a poll were to be taken of American law
professors (or even of American lawyers) as to which are the least interesting
areas of the law, I am moderately confident that ERISA would get a few votes.
192. Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,22 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 771 (1988).
193. Id. at 772.
194. Id. at 798.
195. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2001).
196. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2001).
197. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)(B) (2001).
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state law claims into federal questions, but to completely displace state law
claims." 8 Consequently, Medicare patients may have a better chance of
prevailing with their claims than individual and employment-based
subscribers. Because Medicare is a government program subject to
elaborate statutory guidelines and due process requirements, those
participants have access to well-structured and less costly appeal and
grievance procedures.1 99
The central theme of most cases brought in state court, in which the
defendant files a motion to remove the case to federal court, is whether the
state cause of action "relates to"200 employee benefits or is to "recover
benefits due." 20 1 In the malpractice area, the district courts are split as to
whether ERISA preempts a vicarious liability action against an HMO. In
1995, two federal court of appeals decisions represented exciting
developments. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. 202 held that malpractice
claims were not to recover benefits due under a plan-plaintiffs received
benefits; the problem was with the quality of care and this presented a
cognizable claim not preempted. 203 The court contrasted its decision with
cases involving utilization reviewers denying treatment, even though the
actual harm to the patient might be similar. Pacificareof Oklahoma Inc. v.
Burrage2°4 held that no reference to the plan is necessary in determining
medical malpractice, so it allowed that claim, and also permitted the
remand of the loss of consortium claim to state court in the wrongful death
suit.2°5
Other courts, including the lower Dukes court, 206 have held that
malpractice claims relate directly to the plan because the plan holds itself
out in its literature as assuring a certain quality of services. It follows that
allegations of negligence and fraud in administering a plan will be
preempted. Cases often involve interpreting details of the plan document,
the client's medical condition, the disclosure and grievance provisions of
ERISA, and potential claims of breach of fiduciary duties on the part of
198. Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ala., 868 F.2d 430, 431 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989).
199. For an excellent description of the remedies offered Medicare patients as compared
to other HMO members, see Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to Care in Health
Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal
Procedures,94 COLutM. L. REv. 1674 (1994).
200. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2001).
201. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)(B) (2001).
202. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995).
203. Id. at 357-58 ("We are confident that a claim about the quality of a benefit received
is not a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) to 'recover benefits due.., under the terms of the
plan.').
204. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
205. Id. at 151.
206. 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

108

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4.1

HMOs (even their utilization review personnel). However, this is an
expensive and time-consuming undertaking and ERISA offers no damage
awards-its relief is purely equitable in nature. In theory, ERISA is a
powerful tool on behalf of employees, but its limited relief and the narrow
scope of judicial decision-making have compromised its effectiveness.
In fact, often the only thread patients under ERISA-sponsored plans
can hang onto is an error on the part of the employer, sponsor, or other
fiduciary in meeting its notice requirements. Again, since employee
benefits plans are voluntary, the employer may terminate benefits at any
time, provided adequate notice is given. 207
Indeed, in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, °0 a harbinger of
Lockheed, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[e]mployers or other plan
sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to
adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.,, 209 The amendments cannot,
however, violate ERISA's substantive provisions. For example, an
employer cannot amend a plan to require fifteen years of service in order to
vest in a pension. 2 1 Nor can an employer violate the express terms of a
plan or other governing documents, or fail to provide proper notice to
employees under ERISA. 2 1' But, under ERISA, what constitutes a
substantive provision in welfare benefits, even more so than in pension
plans, is largely procedural.
To review, where the employer sponsoring the health benefits plan is a
fiduciary, a weakness in the statute is that it exempts certain corporate
settlor functions from the requirements of loyalty and proscriptions against
self-dealing. ERISA permits the employer to wear two hats. 12 Because
employee benefit plans are voluntary, the employer is free to terminate
such benefits anytime, provided only that it give adequate notice to
participants. This falls under the rubric of implied contract rights that arise
from the plan document. ERISA has an odd wrinkle: the employer is not
obligated to pay the claims, per se, but, as a fiduciary, it is obligated to
notify participants in time to seek alternative coverage or to forward
deductions and not convert them to corporate use. Of course, if a
beneficiary has a pre-existing condition and cannot get alternative
coverage, that is not the employer's problem.
207. Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
208. 514 U.S. 73 (1995).
209. Id. at 78.
210. That would violate ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2000), which prohibits
denying accrued benefits. However, welfare plans are free of some of these restrictions
upon pension plans. See, e.g., Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. at 1228; Groover v. Michelin N.
Am., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
211. See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1162 (3d Cir. 1990).
212. See Local Union 2134, UMW v. Powhatan Fuel, Inc., 828 F.2d 710, 713 (1Ith Cir.
1987).
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ERISA requires that a plan's claim procedures be reasonable, and
described in an accessible manner for employees. Where a claim is denied,
the participant must be told the specific reasons for the denial and the
material or information needed to perfect the claim.
Note, however, that
these regulations are somewhat relaxed where a plan provides benefits
through an HM0 21 4 There is a severe penalty, of up to $100 per day for
the administrator's failure to provide participants with requested
information. 215 Courts have generally required administrative remedies to
be exhausted prior to filing suit. Most circuits apply a de novo standard of
review to benefits determinations, 216 but have refused to apply the doctrine
of contra preferentum to resolve ambiguities against the companies that
draft or adopt the plans and insurance policies.217 In applying de novo
review, courts should look to the conflicts of interest of the party
determining
benefits, but often, they just reluctantantly acknowledge the
215
confict.
These cases truly combine tragedy and farce. For example, in Wilson
v. Group Hospital & Medical Service, Inc. ,219 an employee under a group
health plan covered by ERISA was forced to sue her insurer, seeking an
injunction to compel guaranteed payment for bone marrow transplant
therapy together with high dosage chemotherapy.
In granting the
injunction, the district court dryly observed that the employee faced the
"ultimate irreparable injury"-death-if therapy were discontinued.
Moreover, the public interest would be furthered by having the notice
requirements of ERISA plans complied with through the use of a
preliminary injunction. 220
One could view the entire managed care scheme as poisoned by
conflicts of interest and marked by prohibited transactions-the health care
provider paying itself to review claims and to insure the entire undertaking.
Each claim denied inures to the benefit of the HMO. The employee is not
just at the mercy of the employer, who may terminate coverage at any time.
She also, because of problems with preemption, might be better off as an
individual subscriber to an HMO in seeking full compensatory damages.
The barrier of the preemption edifice cannot be overstated here. These
cases are expensive to try. The worst that can happen from the defendant's
point of view is that it will have to pay the claims originally due, and
nothing more. There is no incentive to settle, but rather to drag the case on
213. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.03-1.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-5(a).
ERISA § 502(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(2001).
Cf. Rodriquez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580 (Ist Cir. 1993).
See Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1992).
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
791 F. Supp. 309 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Id. at314.
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as long as possible, which the plaintiff and her lawyers usually cannot
afford.
C. Lawful DiscriminationUnder ERISA: The McGann Example
One of the most notorious cases in the short annals of ERISA
jurisprudence is the Fifth Circuit's 1991 decision in McGann v. H & H
Music Co. 22 1 This case, too, foreshadowed the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Lockheed. The case exposes the raw conflict among employees facing
serious illness, their employers, and the employers' insurance carriers.
Consequently, it affords us the opportunity to observe the discursive
practices surrounding ERISA jurisprudence and, again, the justification by
certain businesses and courts for their ethical and political choices.
The plaintiff, John McGann, an employee of H & H Music Co.,
discovered that he had HIV. Soon thereafter, he submitted his first claims
for reimbursement under the company's group medical plan. At the time,
the plan provided for lifetime medical benefits of up to one million
dollars. 222 Upon learning of McGann's illness and what its long-term costs
might be, his employer, through its insurer, amended the plan to limit
benefits payable for AIDS-related claims to a lifetime maximum of five
thousand dollars. 223 The amendment did not place this limitation on any
other catastrophic illness, no matter how costly. 2 4 McGann's suit under
ERISA claimed that his employer, the plan administrator, and the plan
insurer had all discriminated against him by reducing benefits for treatment
of HIV and HIV-related illnesses. 225 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment226 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, on the grounds that ERISA
does not prohibit welfare plan discrimination between or among categories
of diseases.227 This is the line of reasoning followed in the Lockheed228
221. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 981 (1992).
222. Id. at 403.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. 742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
227. ERISA contains a nondiscrimination provision, § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2001),
which provides that,
It shall be unlawful for any person to... discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions
of the employer benefit plan.... or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the
plan.
The "may," in the last part of this provision, is read as an "is" in cases such as
McGann.
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decision and reflected in Justice Scalia's concern during the oral argument
that the employer's right to discriminate be preserved.
In McGann, the Fifth Circuit looked to a Second Circuit decision,
Moore v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.,229 for guidance:
With regard to an employer's right to change medical plans,
Congress evidenced its recognition of the need for flexibility in
rejecting the automatic vesting of welfare plans ....
medical
insurance must take account of inflation, changes in medical
practice and technology, and increases in the costs of treatment
independent of inflation. 230
As succinctly stated by the Fifth Circuit in McGann, to interpret
ERISA § 510 "discrimination" so broadly as to preclude employers from
placing a lifetime cap on a particular type of coverage would clearly
conflict with Congress's intent that employers remain free to create, modify
and terminate the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans without
governmental interference.23' The Court held that McGann had the burden
of proving discriminatory intent directed specifically at him and then stated
that there was "nothing in the record to suggest that defendants' motivation
was other than as they asserted, namely to avoid the expense of paying for
AIDS treatment... no more for McGann than for any other present or
future plan beneficiary who might suffer from AIDS."' 2 The McGann
Court also professed concern for employees by noting that allowing the
vesting of medical benefits and curtailing an employer's prerogative to
change medical plans could lead to decreased protection for future
employees and retirees in that it might force employers to cease offering
welfare benefits coverage altogether. 23 3 Businesses are hurt by the high
cost of health insurance, but courts do not typically engage in such an
analysis vis t vis other types of discrimination.
Aside from the particulars of the individual claim, these cases raise
profound questions about the conflicts of interest at play in "managed
care." Imagine any other area involving fiduciary and ethical obligations to
the welfare and care of third parties-trusts and estates law, corporate and
securities law, the lawyer's canon of ethics, or doctors' Hippocratic

In Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394 (1lth Cir. 1993), the Eleventh Circuit
reached the same conclusion relying on nearly identical facts.
228. 517 U.S. 882 (1996).
229. 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988).
230. McGann, 946 F.2d at 407 (citations and internal quotations ommitted) (quoting
Moore, 856 F.2d at 492).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 404.
233. Id. at 407.
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Oath2 3 4-and it is difficult to find a comparable example in which individuals
and entities occupy conflicting roles so freely. The Pegram case, described
in the following section, is the best example.
D.

The "Exclusive Benefit" Rule is "Managed": Cynthia Herdrich's
Appendix

As noted in the introduction, the Supreme Court has decided that an
HMO that gives bonuses to doctors for limiting the cost of patient care does
not violate the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA. In Herdrich v.
235 plaintiff Cynthia Herdrich
Pegram,
charged that an HMO's physician
failed to treat her appendicitis adequately because the physician failed to
authorize a timely ultrasound procedure.236
On March 7, 1991, Lori Pegram, Herdrich's doctor, discovered a six
by eight centimeter "mass" (later determined to be her appendix) in
Herdrich's abdomen.237 Although the mass was inflamed, Pegram delayed
immediate treatment for Herdrich and forced her to wait eight days to
obtain an ultrasound for purposes of determining the nature, size, and exact
location of the mass. 238 The ultrasound should have been performed
immediately, but, in "non-emergency" situations, the Carle Clinic required
plan participants to receive care from Carle-staffed facilities. 239 Herdrich
had to wait for an ultrasound at a Carle facility more than fifty miles away.
Her appendix ruptured in the interim.24 0 According to the case:
The defendant-physicians managed the Plan, including the doctor
referral process, the nature and duration of patient treatment, and
the extent to which participants were required to use Carle-owned
facilities. In fact, the board of directors consisted exclusively of
the Plan's physicians who were thus in control of each and every
aspect of the HMO's governance, including their own year-end
234. The Hippocratic Oath reads, in part:
I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and
judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is
deleterious and mischievous ....With purity and with holiness I will pass my
life and practice my Art ....While I continue to keep this Oath unviolated,
may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the art, respected by all
men, in all times! But should I trespass and violate this Oath, may the reverse be
my lot!
HIPPOCRATES, THE GENUINE WORKS OF HIPPOCRATES 299-301 (Francis Adams trans., The
Classics of Medicine Library ed. 1985) (1849).
235. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998)
236. Id. at 365 n.1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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bonuses.241
Moreover, "the defendants had the exclusive right to decide all
disputed and non-routine claims. 242 This means that under the functional
test, the defendants were fiduciaries. The incentive structure at Carle was
pernicious because the physician/administrators' year-end bonuses were
based on the difference between total plan costs (the cost of providing
medical care) and revenues (payments by plan beneficiaries).
Herdrich sued the HMO and Dr. Pegram in state court under various
tort law theories. 243 The HMO successfully petitioned to have the case
removed to federal court on grounds of preemption.2 4 In federal court,
Herdrich also alleged that the HMAO's administrators breached their
fiduciary duties under ERISA by accepting annual bonuses for restricting
patient care, which depleted the plan's assets. 245 As noted above, there are
no compensatory punitive damages under ERISA, but Herdrich still wanted
the fiduciaries to make restitution to the plan for breach of fiduciary duties.
Herdrich's lawyers pressed the case that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duty to all the plan beneficiaries by depriving them of proper
medical care and retaining the resultant savings for themselves. Plainly,
this was not acting "for the exclusive benefit" of the participants and their
beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overruled the
Illinois Federal District Court's dismissal of this count and reinstated the
employee's case.246
In contrast to the Supreme Court's action in Spink, which usurped the
role of the fact-finder, 247 the Seventh Circuit addressed the minimal
requirements of stating a claim: (1) that the defendants are plan fiduciaries,
(2) who breached their fiduciary duties, which (3) resulted in a cognizable
loss.
In her complaint, Herdrich claimed that the "defendants breached their
fiduciary duty to plan beneficiaries by depriving them of proper medical
care and retaining the savings resulting therefrom for themselves. 248 In
reinstating Herdrich's claim, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Our point is not that a fiduciary may not have dual loyalties; it is
that the tolerance of dual loyalties does not extend to the situation
like the case before us where a fiduciary jettisons his
responsibility to the physical well-being of beneficiaries in favor

241. Id. at 370 (emphasis omitted).

242. Id.
243. Id. at 365-66.
244. Id. at 366.

245. Id. at 366 n.3.
246. Id. at 380.
247. Spink v. Lockheed, 60 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1995).
248. Herdrich,154 F.3d at 366.
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of 'loyalty' to his own financial interests. Tolerance, in other
words, has its limits. 249
The dissent, invoking the law of the market, argued that dual loyalties
and incentive schemes are per se valid without limitation.2 ° Only when
there is a "breakdown in the market... [or a] serious flaw in the manner in
which the incentive arrangement is established" can there be a breach of
fiduciary duty. 251
Alluding to exit strategy, the dissent further argued, without proof:
[P]lan sponsors are likely to take their business elsewhere if they
perceive that incentives are working to the detriment of
beneficiaries or the plan itself, and thus market forces go a long
way towards ensuring that incentives do not rise to dangerous or
undesirable levels... [J]udicial efforts to determine permissible
levels of financial incentives through the vehicle of ERISA's
fiduciary rules are unnecessary and ill-advised. No standards for
conducting such an inquiry exist. Such a move would preempt
legislative and regulatory efforts in this area and could seriously
disrupt the ability of plan sponsors and beneficiaries to manage
plan assets by agreeing to incentives that encourage costconscious medical decisionmaking... I fear that the decision
today could lead, both in this case and in the future, to untethered
judicial assessments of permissible incentive levels in health care
252
plans.
In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Lockheed and Hughes, it is
perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court adopted reasoning similar to
the lower court dissent, and rejected Herdrich's claim-thereby rejecting
the claims of all participants on behalf of the plan.
Whereas in Spink and Hughes the Supreme Court suggested that the
employees were gold-diggers, during Herdrich's oral25argument
some of the
3
justices mocked the plaintiffs act of class solidarity:
Q. What's really at stake for your client at this stage?
A. My client does not stand to profit individually or personally
from this case. What we are seeking is to recoup the bonuses that
we believe are paid in violation of fiduciary duties under
ERISA...
249. Id. at 373.
250. Id. at 380-84.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 383.
253. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript 50, Wednesday, Feb. 23, 2000,
No. 98-1949, 68 USLW 3487, 2000 WL 213101 (U.S. Oral. Arg.) 2000 U.S. TRANS
LEXIS 15.
254. Id. at *46.
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Q. ... may I go back to your answer to Justice Scalia? You
were telling him [that] this case [is not].., a malpractice case...
What is it?
A. It's a breach of fiduciary duty case.
Q. Resulting in what kind of harm? I mean, in a malpractice
case we know what the harm is ... What exactly is the harm?
A. The harm is that the money that is paid into the risk pool...
50% of the premium is paid by the employee. The harm here is
that the money, which is supposed to be used exclusively for
health care, is not being used exclusively for health care.
Q. So you're basically making a financial management claim.
You're saying they're misapplying funds?
A. Yes, absolutely. They are breaching their fiduciary duties...
You asked me what the harm is. What strikes me about this case,
unusual about this case is that the courts zealously protect money
for money's sake with respect to pension plans... If you look
at... other cases that are dealing with pension benefits, any
fiduciary under one of those plans has never been able to deal
with the funds in that plan if profit, self-profit from the dealing
of-with those funds.55
Q. Are you saying that it just happens to be a coincidence that
you are bringing this financial mismanagement claim under the
same-joined with the same pleadings that happen to make
malpractice claims? Are you saying that out of the blue, even if
you client had lived a totally healthy life and never been denied
an immediate appendectomy, that you could still bring this
claim...?
6
A. Essentially, that's correct, Judge.21

The Supreme Court's reasoning technique involved parsing the
pleadings "very carefully. ' z 7 They read Herdrich's complaint not to allege
a fiduciary breach with respect to administrative decisions about "pure
eligibility," but mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.2-8
Justice Souter reasoned that "any doubt" that Congress did not intend
HMOs to be treated as fiduciaries "hardens into conviction" when the focus
255. Id. at 149-50.
256. Id. at::51.
257. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
258. Id. at 226-32.

116

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 4.1

shifts to the consequences of the alternative view.5 9
But the "doubt" appears to have been just a rhetorical conceit of
opinion-writing because the justices barely give pause to consider ERISA's
roots in trust law: "[tihe statute provides that fiduciaries shall discharge
their duties with respect to a plan 'solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries.'... These responsibilities ... have the familiar ring of
their source in the common law of trusts. 26 °
The Court explains the settled rule that ERISA permits the same actors
to perform settlor functions as fiduciary functions:
ERISA does require, however, that the fiduciary with two hats
wear only one at a time, and wear the fiduciary hat when making
fiduciary decisions... In every case charging breach of ERISA
fiduciary duty, then, the threshold question is not whether the
actions of some person employed to provide services under a
plan adversely affected a plan beneficiary's interest, but whether
that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, was performing a
fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to complaint.26
Ignoring the legislative history of the Act and the plain meaning of the
statute, the Court distinguishes the IMO from that of a "traditional"
fiduciary:
Mixed eligibility decisions by an HMO acting through its
physicians have, however, only a limited resemblance to the
usual business of traditional trustees.... Traditional trustees
administer a medical trust by paying out money to buy medical
care, whereas physicians making mixed eligibility decisions
consume the money as well. Private trustees do not make
treatment judgments, whereas treatment judgments are what
259. Id. at 232.
260. Id. at 222-24. The Court, quoting outside sources, then explains these duties:
The most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust
is the duty of loyalty.... It is the duty of a trustee to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiaries." 2A A. ScoTT & W. FRATCHER, TRUSTS
§ 170, 311 (4th ed. 1987) (hereinafter Scott); see also G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT,
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. 1980) ("Perhaps the most
fundamental duty of a trustee is that he must display throughout the
administration of the trust complete loyalty to the interests of the beneficiary
and must exclude all selfish interests and all consideration of the interests of
third persons.");... Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,464, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(1928) (Cardozo, J.) ("Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.").
Id. at 224.
261. Id. at 224; see also supra III A.
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physicians reaching mixed decisions do make, by definition....
The settings bear no more resemblance to trust departments than
a decision to operate turns on the262factors controlling the amount
of a quarterly income distribution.
The Court did not, however, distinguish Cynthia Herdrich from
"traditional" beneficiaries.
Despite the "two-hat" model federal courts have adopted under the
developing federal common law of ERISA, Congress never chose to enact
separate fiduciary provisions for health plan trustees. The Supreme Court
substitutes its own reasoning that Congress "would have":
[Wihen Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility
under ERISA, it concentrated on fiduciaries' financial decisions,
focusing on pension plans, the difficulty many retirees faced in
getting the payments they expected, and the financial
mismanagement that had too often deprived employees of their
benefits.... Its focus was far from the subject of Herdrich's
claim. Our doubt that Congress intended the category of
fiduciary administrative functions to encompass the mixed
determinations at issue here hardens into conviction when we
consider the consequences
that would follow from Herdrich's
26 3
contrary view.
The consequences are hardships on ilMOs. Thus, the Supreme Court
abandoned plain meaning. Moreover, while invoking the market, the
Supreme Court has arguably tinkered with that same construct: for
hundreds of years the market has developed and adapted under the confines
of the common law of trusts, but the Court fears the market under the
regulatory hand of ERISA.
V.

CONCLUSION

More than five trillion dollars are now invested in American pension
and retirement income programs.264 Peter Drucker proclaimed almost
twenty-five years ago that if "socialism" is defined as "ownership of the
means of production by the workers," then the United States is the first
truly socialist country. Through their pension funds, "employees of
American businesses own at least 25% of its equity capital, which is more
than enough to control. 265 The figure is more like 30% now, but

262. Id. at 231-32.
263. Id.
264. This is a 1994 figure. The current figure is probably much higher given the growth
of the stock market these past five years. HUBBARD, supra note 64, at 45-47.
265. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SOCIALISM
CAME TO AMERICA 1 (1976).
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employees do not control these pension funds, and they reflect anything but
266
social equality.
In a global economy that best serves asset holders and highly skilled
workers, the affluent will increasingly choose private market solutions over
public goods and universal access to state-run programs.267 The private
market solution with minimal state intervention is exemplified by ERISA,
but the market can extend further, and employers can opt out of providing
any benefits. Employers could tell employees to control their own destiny,
get a computer, do some day trading, and invest for their retirement on their
own.26 In staggering numbers, businesses, citing costs, are already opting
out of providing health insurance.
ERISA has undergone growing pains as a body of law. Ironically, the
invocation of trust law reflected Congress's commitment to a legal order
founded on predictable, manageable doctrine. The judiciary's goal is
developing legal doctrine so as to present it as rational, comprehensive, and
coherent. Bourdieu uses the example of the legal status of labor unions to
explain how the "juridical field is the site of a competition for monopoly of
the right to determine the law., 269 Beginning in the nineteenth century, the
power relations shifted from a time when collective worker action was an
illegal criminal conspiracy to the time in the twentieth century when unions
received full recognition. However, under ERISA jurisprudence we see a
more negative shift where the duty of undivided loyalty is diminished over
time as applied to employee benefit plans.
Because of the complexity of ERISA legislation, this shift in the
doctrine may be disguised by a technical view of the law intensified by the
proliferation of legislation. 270
Moreover, "the sources of law in
governmental agencies are so numerous and varied that its formal
rationality tends to appear merely as the requirement that a specific rule be
traceable to some decision or procedure of an ostensibly authoritative
governmental agency."27'
The Treasury and Labor Department's
multiplicity of rules and opinion letters interpreting ERISA provide ample
authority. Further, although the Supreme Court did not cite its amicus
briefs, the Labor Department in neither Lockheed nor Hughes supported the
workers. Here we see one way in which legal ideology and state
institutions mediate what, at bottom, is a political struggle.
266. Id.
267. NOBLE, supra note 36, at 136-37.
268. Of course, major changes in the tax system would be needed; for instance,
individual retirement accounts would have to permit more than current levels of deductible
income.
269. Bourdieu, supra note 29, at 817.
270. ROGER COTrERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 213-15 (1994).
271. Id. at 228 (emphasis in original).
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In a 1987 ERISA case addressing preemption, the Supreme Court
observed that it was "obliged in interpreting" a particular clause under the
preemption provision "to consider... the role [of the clause] in ERISA as
a whole."2 2 The Court might now say that in its decisions it has been
considering the role of the "exclusive benefit" rule in ERISA as a whole:
"[o]n numerous occasions we have noted that '[i]n expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."' 273
But how the exclusive benefit is to be read within the context of the "object
and policy" of ERISA in a manner not detrimental to the interests of
beneficiaries is precisely what is contested.
Under the "attitudinal model" of Professors Segal and Spaeth, judges
vote because of their preferences, not because of what the "law" is.274 But
the judge's preferences are the law, and are so reflected in social
practice.27' In all of the cases highlighted above, we saw the exercise of
judges' preferences in choosing among antagonistic interests and rights.276
It is not a matter of questioning whether the old legal relations of trust
law survived to the detriment of workers, for these relations should have
helped workers (at least according to Congress's enunciation of the purpose
of ERISA).277 The relations have given way to a kind of modified
"business judgment rule" under ERISA that permits dual loyalties. In
doing so, has not ERISA's enforcement scheme successfully mediated, in
conjunction with judicial decision-making, the political struggle over the
administration of pension and health care benefits?
The problem of mediating antagonistic rights is one that the law and
economics adherents claim will be addressed by market forces-with a
little help from enlightened courts. It would be politically impossible to
require mandatory benefits and the cases imply knowledge as such with
courts lending half-hearted support to employees' claims for breach of
fiduciary duty. Lockheed, Hughes, and Pegram all address the market
forces that operate to maintain any benefits. Moreover, Congress, in
enacting ERISA, and the courts, in enforcing it, have deployed the contract
paradigm that has long advanced the theory that rational actors will do
what needs to be done. "ERISA was enacted to 'promote the interest of
employees and their beneficiaries in employer benefit plans' and 'to protect
272. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)(internal quotations and
citations omitted).
273. Id.

274.

JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL

MODEL 302-32 (1993).
275. BRIGHAM, supra note 17.

276. Id.
277. See generally ORRIN, supra note 76 (asking a related question concerning the
National Labor Relations Act).
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ERISA is not an entitlement program at all, just an edifice of rules.279
Employers do not have to provide any benefits, so the "three-legged stool"
approach to income security-Social Security, employer pensions, and
personal savings-is not stable. ERISA jurisprudence is itself an integral
element in constituting this political economy. 2 0 ERISA reflects the idea
that the American welfare state is "exceptional because it is so market
conforming. After a hundred years of welfare-state building, Americans
remain more vulnerable to the free play of market forces than do the people
of nearly every other rich capitalist society. 2 8 '
While ERISA was purportedly enacted to ease the impact of market
forces upon the employee, its jurisprudence has often invoked the theory of
the market to resolve the tension within the statute between a purely
voluntary legal order and strict fiduciary obligations to workers.

278. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (quoting
respectively Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) and Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Ressell, 47 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)).
279. ERISA is analogous to the Great Society's offering the poor an equality of
"opportunity" rather than of "condition." NOBLE, supra note 23, at 10.
280. Cf. LABOR LAW INAMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS, xvi (Christopher
L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992).
281. Id. at 3.

